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BOOK REVIEWS

is professional military education necessary?
Ricks, Thomas E. The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today. New
York: Penguin, 2012. 576pp. $32.95

Tom Ricks has earned over the past
two decades a justified reputation as a
thorough and knowledgeable military
correspondent. His latest work addresses the decline in the competence
of generals in the U.S. Army, which he
regards as a major and timely issue. As
is to be expected from such a thoughtful journalist, Ricks has produced an
important book that should spark debate
and discussion not only among the
Army’s leaders but also among those of
the other services. The Generals is well
written and at times insightful. Indeed,
it makes a plausible case that there is
something flawed in the choice and
education of Army leaders. For that
reason alone it deserves close attention
from those responsible for the shaping
and course of service personnel policies
that guide the preparation and promotion of America’s future military leaders.
Nevertheless, there are serious weaknesses in Ricks’s examination. Admittedly, he has provided an excellent
catalogue of the symptoms that indicate
the decline in quality of Army generals from George Marshall to Tommy
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Franks. However, in the end, Ricks’s
account fails to address systemic factors
that lie behind that decline. Thus at few
points does he draw out the underlying
landscape of causality and accident, the
impact of chance on events, the other
possibilities open to Army leaders of
the past, or the impact of trends and
political choices on the Army’s leadership. Moreover, he fails to address
the elusive but essential problem of
changes in the Army’s culture over
time, or how and why those changes
came about. Yet from this military
historian’s point of view, that last issue
represents the crucial element in the
effectiveness of military institutions.
What this review aims to suggest is
some of the larger areas that do not
form a part of Ricks’s account, such as
the problem of unexpected changes in
the underlying culture of the Army;
the problem of unintended effects in
personnel decisions and overall policy;
the often baleful choices that political
leaders have imposed on the Army; the
importance of understanding the continuity of events in examining the leaders
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who reach the senior levels; and above
all, the intellectual framework within
which that leadership has developed.
The difficulty with developing military
leaders to which Ricks alludes is that
the military profession demands two
different attributes in its leaders, attributes that flow from the very nature
of the profession. As Michael Howard
so brilliantly suggested in an address at
the Royal United Services Institute in
the early 1970s, the military represents
a profession that, fortunately, rarely
gets to practice the fundamental reason
for its existence—namely, the conduct
of wars. That reality in turn makes the
leadership of military forces not only
the most physically demanding of all
the professions but the most demanding intellectually. The mere running of
military forces in peacetime, particularly
after the Second World War, has become
such a complex task that its leaders can
all too easily lose sight of the reason
why their organizations exist. Moreover,
over the course of the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries military institutions have confronted the considerable
problems that rapid changes in technology bring in their wake. How then are
military leaders to address a world in
constant flux, with its massive social and
technological changes? Most importantly, they cannot replicate the horrors
and complexities of the battlefield on
which their soldiers, marines, sailors,
and airmen will fight. That conundrum
represents the heart of peacetime innovation, on which the combat effectiveness of military institutions depends.
Let us begin with George C. Marshall,
whom Ricks has quite rightly selected
as the paradigm by which those who
aspire to high command should model
their careers (but more often do not).
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The problem with selecting Marshall,
however, is that he was an anomaly
in the officer corps. Significantly, and
reflective of the weaknesses in his analysis, Ricks omits to discuss Marshall’s
seminal role as the deputy commandant
of the Army’s Infantry School, at Fort
Benning, in the 1930s. In that post the
Army’s future chief of staff emphasized
the education of the faculty as well as of
the students. If he kept a “black book” in
which he recorded the most outstanding,
as well as the least capable, of the officers
with whom he came in contact, it was
at Fort Benning. There he could, and
undoubtedly did, observe a considerable
number of officers who passed through
that institution as either faculty members or students and who would eventually lead the U.S. Army in World War II.
In the midst of the rush to mobilize a
grossly unprepared institution to meet
the desperate situation of 1940, Marshall’s emphasis on education remained
steadfast. Significantly, with the world
going to hell in a handbasket in June
1940, two out of the six faculty members of the Army War College at Fort
McNair were Colonel W. H. Simpson
and Major J. Lawton Collins. In today’s
military an assignment as instructor to
a war college during a major crisis is a
sure sign of the end of a career. Not so in
Marshall’s army. Simpson would become
a lieutenant general by 1944 and command the Ninth Army in the European
Theater of Operations, while Collins
would be a division commander by 1942
on Guadalcanal, a corps commander
in Europe by 1944, later an army chief
of staff, and in the postwar period the
Army’s chief of staff. Yet both remained
in their faculty positions for the remainder of the 1940–41 academic year. That
is perhaps where the greatest difference
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lies between the culture of today’s
military and the attitude of Marshall.
Ricks is quite right to underline the
ruthlessness with which Marshall and
his senior subordinates fired those who
failed to measure up to the demands of
war. He is, however, on shakier ground
in suggesting that they were willing to
give those who failed a second chance.
In fact, such cases were quite rare.
Moreover, it is at the more junior levels
(major and below) where one might
consider a few second chances. In that
respect, it is worth noting that Major
Jack Galvin was one of the junior officers who felt General William DePuy’s
wrath during the Vietnam War and
was fired. Nevertheless, in the Army of
the 1970s, his career recovered, and he
eventually reached the post of Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe. In terms
of World War II, the generals, for the
most part, who were removed from
command disappeared into retirement
or into commands stateside as colonels.
Those who did not were the exceptions.
Marshall and his subordinates were
able to purge those whom they believed
incompetent because the United States
faced a challenge to its existence. Confronting that reality as well, the media
were hardly willing to complain about
the firing of incompetent officers from
senior command positions. Thus it may
be a stretch to point to command policies in a time of national emergency as a
pattern worth following in the present.
A great weakness in Ricks’s account
lies in his failure to address the importance of professional military education (PME) to create a culture that can
innovate in peacetime and adapt to the
unexpected conditions of combat. The
historical record of the interwar period
suggests that the schoolhouse provided
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the basis for the strategic and operational framework within which America’s
military forces conducted and won the
great campaigns of a two-front war, one
that saw the projection of U.S. power
across the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.
One of the possible explanations for the
prewar emphasis on PME lies in the fact
that without any significant resources
in those years, the U.S. military had no
choice but to devote much of its energy
to serious study. On the other hand, it
is also clear that many officers in that
military believed that as members of a
serious profession, they needed to study
their profession just as lawyers and doctors do. On the Navy side of the house, it
is significant that one of the most innovative CINCUSs (Commanders in Chief,
United States), Admiral Joseph Reeves,
spent a tour on the faculty at the Naval
War College, in Newport, Rhode Island,
while the future admiral Raymond Spruance, the great leader of the Central Pacific drive, spent two tours on its faculty.
At the end of World War II, many of
the returning generals and admirals
who had led U.S. forces identified the
staff and war colleges as having played
major roles in preparing them for the
arduous tasks they had just confronted.
Eisenhower, as the Army’s chief of staff,
went so far as to take a major part in the
founding of the National War College.
However, almost immediately the staff
and war colleges declined in importance,
until by the sixties they represented
refuges in which both faculty and students could search for postretirement
jobs or play golf. Thus the instruments
for the study of the military profession
never really recovered the influence
they had possessed before the war.
There are a number of possible explanations. This reviewer favors two. First,
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the pressures of the Cold War and the
conduct of major wars in Korea and
Vietnam led senior leaders to devalue
education in favor of readiness. Second,
but equally important, was the fact that
the generation of leaders that assumed
control of the American military in
the early sixties had risen rapidly to
command positions in the massive
mobilization of World War II. Like
Westmoreland—who refused a potential
assignment to the Army War College
with the comment that he was too
advanced to be a student but was willing
to serve as a faculty member—many officers dismissed the idea of serious study
of their profession, having “learned” everything they needed to know about war
and strategy from combat experience.
By skipping across a broad spectrum
of the Army’s history, however, Ricks
ignores two other factors in the decline in the Army’s generalship: the
constraints that the post–World War
II reforms in personnel policies created and still impose on the American
military and the impact of the choices
that political and military leaders
inevitably make in the running of a
complex organization. What was clear
to those who had served in the interwar
military was that the system of promotion then had not only been unfair but
rewarded the slow, the plodding, and
the stupid. Moreover, as Marshall’s firing
of so many officers at the war’s outset
underlined, the system had kept large
numbers of officers on active duty who
were too old or incompetent to serve
in the harsh conditions of wartime.
The result was a major reform of the
personnel system in the late 1940s and
early 1950s. The “up or out” system,
modeled on the industrial practices
of the time, largely frames the present
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practice. That system also aimed at keeping more officers at the middle levels
than needed, to address the problems
that a massive mobilization in a major
world war with the Soviet Union would
require. The up-or-out part of the equation aimed at ensuring that the system
would prevent the stagnation that had
marked the interwar Army and forced
Marshall to fire so many superannuated
officers. Moreover, the new personnel
system, with its financial inducements
encouraging majors, lieutenant colonels,
and colonels to retire in their middle
and early forties, fit the health profiles
of the time. This, after all, was a period
when officers smoked like chimneys
and drank like fish. It certainly fit
the model that American businesses
had established for their executives,
a model that came close to destroying the competitiveness of American
industry in the 1970s. Most American
industries have changed their personnel
systems, forcing out those who fail to
comply. The American military has not.
The unintended consequences of this
system now plague the U.S. military.
Above all, the twenty-year up-or-out
system has created minimal flexibility
for the broader education of the officer
corps. Moreover, it encourages significant numbers of outstanding officers
to retire at precisely the point when
they could offer much to their services.
The retirement policies have resulted
in a brain drain that encourages many
of the brightest and most competent
to leave as early as they can to begin
their second careers. Simply put, no
competent business would allow the
loss of talent that now takes place every
year, as exceptional officers retire in
their midforties. The bottom line has
been a culture of few risk takers and
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too many conformists. Therefore, the
future Petraeuses of the Army, who
have pursued efforts to broaden their
knowledge of military and strategic
history, have found themselves regarded
by many of their colleagues as outliers.
They are to all intents and purposes the
exceptions to the rule, while too many
others like Tommy Franks and Ricardo
Sanchez have followed the system of
lockstep promotion and assignment.
The Army’s present culture (much like
that of the German army, which lost two
world wars because the brilliance of its
tactics could not overcome its contempt
for strategy and politics) should have
been the centerpiece on which Ricks
hung his argument. In particular, the
failure of Fort Leavenworth and Carlisle
Barracks to provide the educational
underpinnings of Army culture represents the heart of where it has gone
wrong. Of all the military institutions,
the Army most requires the steady hand
of professional military education.
Unfortunately, since 1945 the Army has
been the service least served by that
crucial enabler of military culture. Even
after the Vietnam War underlined the
flaws in the PME system, education
received too little attention from those
in charge. At times their interference
was pernicious, as Ricks quite correctly
points out in his discussion of the conflict between Jack Cushman and William
DePuy. The mantra of the Army War
College (at least when this reviewer was
familiar with it) was that the institution
existed to give officers rests in their busy
careers. A former dean of the college
was even quoted as “preferring that his
officers spend their time on the golf
course rather than in the library.” Most
of the attending officers got the message,
although a few, like the future Marine
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general Paul Van Riper, simply went off
to the Military History Institute and read
books. Today, one of the great ironies in
the Army’s PME system is the fact that
there is intense competition among the
most outstanding Army officers to attend the junior or senior course at Newport and avoid Fort Leavenworth and
Carlisle Barracks. Adding to the irony
is that the Navy itself has over the past
forty years made every effort to avoid
sending its best officers to Newport, or
to any other PME institution, despite
the fact that the Naval War College has
provided far and away the most intellectually challenging education in strategy.
In examining what has happened to the
Army, it is not sufficient to hop, as Ricks
does, from one decade to another to
examine this or that general, who may
or may not reflect the dominant cultural
mores of a huge organization. Following
Vietnam, the pressing problem was to
reconstitute and reinvigorate a military
organization that was on its last legs. It
is not surprising, then, that the Army’s
leadership would concentrate on getting
the tactics right; operations and strategy
could come later. Here the two most important figures in rehabilitating the Army’s leadership were Creighton Abrams
and his successor, Frederick C. Weyand,
who played crucial roles in pushing
forward that extraordinary group of
generals who emerged to put the Army
right in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
DePuy was only one of these generals, and while Ricks is right to credit
him with considerable influence (good
and bad) over the reborn Army of the
1980s, he virtually ignores other equally
important figures. To understand the
intellectual and cultural revolution of
the 1970s at the Army’s higher levels,
we must look at the contributions of
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generals like Don Starry, Paul Gorman,
Glen Otis, and William Richardson.
Astonishingly, Ricks mentions General
“Shy” Meyer, the brilliant Army chief
of staff during the late seventies and
early eighties, only in passing, quoting
his famous comment about the “hollow army.” Yet Meyer, with the help
of the likes of Starry, Richardson, and
Otis, was clearly aiming at creating a
fundamental shift in the Army’s culture.
Asking why he failed and why General
Al Gray of the Marine Corps succeeded
would make for a fascinating examination of the difficulties and pitfalls
involved in changing organizational
culture. It also would have allowed Ricks
to get at the heart of the problem.
Instead, Ricks jumps from his discussion
of DePuy to a discussion of the generalship of Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin
Powell, omitting the important story
of the intellectual retrenchment of the
intervening years, when DePuy, Meyer,
Starry, and Richardson disappeared, to
be replaced by lesser figures. In that tale
lies the real cause of whatever decline
has taken place. As one senior officer
commented to this reviewer, changing
the culture of military organizations
“is like attempting to turn an aircraft
carrier or ocean liner.” But if professional military education is not going to
determine a common culture of excellence, then individual choices are going
to be the major determinants. Therefore,
in understanding the Army’s story, one
also must pay attention to the role that
accident, chance, or miscalculation by
its political masters has played in the
evolution of what appears to be a decline
in the effectiveness of its leadership.
Schwarzkopf was probably least typical
of the Army generals of his generation. Rumors ran in Washington that
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he had been shipped out to Central
Command, at the time a relatively
unimportant theater in the military
pecking order, largely to move him out
of the Army Staff, where his explosive
personality had earned him a reputation for causing turmoil. In other words,
it was chance and an underestimation
of how rapidly the world was changing that led him to fame and fortune.
It was during the 1990s that flawed political choices had the greatest impact on
the culture of the Army’s leadership. It
is not that Tommy Franks appeared mysteriously or as the result of a straight-line
collapse in the culture of the generalofficer corps. In discussing the causes
of the Vietnam disaster, Ricks rightly
highlights the dysfunctional relationship between Lyndon Johnson and his
military advisers—a flawed relationship exacerbated by the dishonesty of
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor. In
President William Clinton’s administration, civil-military relations were equally
dysfunctional, and for similar reasons.
Here the president, for reasons that
remain opaque, appears to have aimed
at appointing senior service commanders who were extraordinarily weak.
The Army got the worst of the deal.
General Dennis Reimer may have been
the weakest of Clinton’s appointments.
Undoubtedly a well-meaning officer,
Reimer nonetheless made decisions that
now have, and will continue to have, a
baleful impact on the Army’s culture.
Simply put, he wrecked Fort Leavenworth by decreeing that all majors would
attend the Command and Staff College,
and that there would be no board selection for officers to attend the college.
The result was a drastic downgrading
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of quality of faculty, students, and
instruction. Reimer then proceeded
to appoint a family friend, General
John Abrams, a skilled soldier with a
dominating personality that brooked
no argument, to the Army’s intellectual
heart, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The other choice
was Lieutenant General Don Holder, an
intellectual soldier who would have been
an ideal individual to hold that position,
but Reimer had been an aide to Creighton Abrams and thus appointed his
son to the critical TRADOC position.
There the younger Abrams created an
atmosphere of fear and distrust among
his subordinates—hardly what the Army
needed when preparing to address the
challenges of the twenty-first century.
In his epilogue, Ricks provides some
suggestions for fixing the Army’s
problems. Unfortunately, they have
not been thought through and for the
most part are not realistic or of much
use in addressing systemic issues. At
best they are pablum. After all, even
if Army leaders were interested in
change (and many are), what could
they possibly do? Of what use are such
statements as “In assessing the strategic situation today, Marshall might
conclude that having adaptive, flexible
military leaders who also are energetic,
determined, cooperative, and trustworthy is probably more important now
than at any time since he was chief of
staff ”? The devil is in the details, and
Ricks has provided no solution as to
how the Army might create general
officers with those characteristics.
As for giving generals second and third
chances, that suggestion would lead to
even greater mediocrity. It would be anything other than the hard-charging and
competent who would get the second
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chances. As this reviewer’s colleague and
friend Colonel Richard Sinnreich has
pointed out, “Could flag officer quality
be improved by institutional changes?
No doubt it could. But those changes
would require more than just better
PME. They would require a willingness
to identify, select, and groom potential
senior leaders in ways to which American society in general, and politicians in
particular, have proved utterly hostile.
Could we fire generals more readily?
Sure, but that’s a damn hard way to
improve quality. Moreover, the Navy already is under growing fire for excessive
command reliefs. The real challenge isn’t
to fire more [generals], as Ricks would
have it, but rather promote fewer with
much more discrimination. Thorough
examinations, 360-degree efficiency
ratings, graded exercise performance—
there are a host of tools available to
winnow future leaders. Firing generals is as much a confession of system
failures as of individual failure, and even
when necessary imposes huge costs.”
In fact, real change would require systemic alteration in the Army’s culture,
which would then require breaking
many rice bowls and discarding many
pet rocks. It would aim at change over
decades rather than over the short term.
It would require massive changes in the
educational approaches at Fort Leavenworth and Carlisle Barracks. In this
regard, the current Army leadership is
taking a step in the right direction by
board-selecting officers to attend Fort
Leavenworth. It would mean making
intellectual performance at PME institutions play a major role in promotions
and assignments. This means that those
institutions would have to force their
students to study the profession of arms
and the crucial issues they will have to
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deal with—war, strategy, and military
operations. It would also make performance at staff and war colleges play a
major role in selection for command positions. Above all, it would mean drastic
changes in the Army’s personnel system,
and to the personnel systems of the other services as well. Had Ricks been willing to wrestle with these issues, he would
have written a very different book.
Perhaps the most depressing aspect of
the landscape of the current American
military has been the return to a moral
calculus that is nothing short of a return
to the sexual standards of the Victorian
age. Over the past several months we
have seen the president of the United
States remove a highly respected retired
general, to whom the country owes
much for his having turned around the
situation in Iraq, from the directorship of the CIA for having an affair.
At the same time the generals who
botched up the war in Iraq were, as
Ricks notes in a number of cases, not
fired. Moreover, in one case, in a sad
repetition of Westmoreland’s promotion to become the Army’s chief of staff
after his disastrous tenure in Vietnam, a
general whose performance was hardly
more impressive was removed from
command in Iraq and promoted to the
position of the Army’s chief of staff.
At present, it would seem that media
and politicians would prefer standards
for military leaders that emphasize
“moral” behavior rather than competence in the profession—standards that
few have followed. In a world where
competence in any profession is an
extraordinarily rare commodity, and
especially competence in the military,
this is indeed a dangerous precedent.
The message emanating from Washington would appear to be that our leaders
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prefer military leaders who are simonpure (at least in their sexual mores) to
competent generals and admirals. In
the end, those at the sharp end will pay
a terrible price for such imbecility.
Williamson Murray

Naval War College
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Winner of the Pulitzer Prize for Biography in 2012, as well as a number of
other awards, John Lewis Gaddis’s study
of George F. Kennan (1904–2005) has
already firmly established itself as the
fundamental scholarly biography for the
Cold War period in American history.
Gaddis began work on this biography in
1981, not long after he had spent a twoyear period as visiting professor of strategy and policy at the Naval War College.
At Newport in those days, he was
already admired for his first book, The
United States and the Origins of the Cold
War, 1941–1947 (Columbia Univ. Press,
1972), and for the exemplary quality of
his teaching, which won him a Department of the Navy Meritorious Civilian
Service Award at the Naval War College.
It was his first book and subsequent
articles that brought Gaddis to Kennan’s
attention and led him to choose Gaddis
as his authorized biographer. In giving
Gaddis unrestricted access to what
would eventually become 330 boxes of
Kennan’s diaries and papers at Princeton
University’s Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript
Library, as well as giving him regular
interviews, Kennan stipulated that
the biography would not be published
during his lifetime and so ensured that
it would be a long-maturing project.
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